IdentityMesh Vault · Enterprise plan

Stop buying PAM as a second product.

Privileged checkout, rotation, and tamper-evident audit — built into the identity platform you already deploy for synchronization. No second vendor. No second agent. No second contract.

IM_VaultAuditEventsappend-only
  1. 0412Nominatedoperator7f3a…91c291c2…b04e
  2. 0413Approvedadmin91c2…b04eb04e…3d71
  3. 0414CheckedOutoperatorb04e…3d713d71…e8a9
  4. 0415Rotatedvault3d71…e8a9e8a9…5c10
  5. 0416CheckedInoperatore8a9…5c105c10…a27f
chain verified · 5 events · 0 gaps
  • 1product, not two
  • 0extra agents on your endpoints
  • $0add-on module fees
  • Daysto stand up, not months

See the vault in ninety seconds.

Checkout, rotation, and the audit chain — on the same platform that already syncs your identities.

Identity is the foundation. Privilege is protected.

CyberArk and Delinea sell a standalone vault that you then integrate with your identity stack. IdentityMesh Vault is built into it instead. Identity data decides who may ask: requests are judged against the same mesh objects and group memberships the connectors already imported. Credential material is a separate concern. It is encrypted at rest in the secret store, released one checkout at a time, and kept out of the identity records themselves. Knowing who someone is never unlocks what they hold.

One deployment.One audit chain.One operations model.

How IdentityMesh Vault compares.

CriterionIdentityMesh VaultCyberArk PAMDelinea Secret Server
DeploymentModule of the identity platform you already runStandalone platform (Vault + CPM + PSM + PVWA)Standalone Secret Server, on-prem or Cloud
Time to stand upDaysMonths, with dedicated adminFaster than CyberArk, still a separate rollout
LicensingIncluded with IdentityMeshPer privileged account + per-module add-onsPer user, tiered; Cloud Platinum sold at premium
Typical cost / user / yearIncluded~$600–$1,400~$45–$110 Server; Cloud materially higher
RotationPer-target setters for AD (LDAPS), SQL logins, and Entra ID (Graph); owner-provided or blind nomination; per-policy schedule with failure backoffCPM plug-ins per platformDiscovery + remote password changers per platform
Using a checked-out credentialReveal once, hand on as a one-time link, or hand it to IdentityMesh Connect, a launcher on the operator's PC that signs Remote Desktop in as the account so the operator never sees the password. No session recordingPSM proxies and records the sessionSecret Server launchers; session recording as an add-on
Secret storeThe secret store you already configured: DPAPI, Azure Key Vault, or HashiCorp VaultProprietary Vault applianceEncrypted DB with HSM options
AuditExtends the append-only audit hash chain shared with sync and admin eventsSession recording + SIEM exportEvent subscriptions + SIEM export
RolesExisting Viewer / Operator / Admin get scoped Vault permissionsMultiple product roles across modulesDistinct roles per Secret Server function

Competitor pricing reflects publicly published benchmarks. Contact us to model your specific quote.

Built for the buyer, not the box.

IT & identity

Cut PAM from a project to a checkbox.

Your CyberArk quote asks for a vault appliance, CPM, PSM, PVWA, and a dedicated admin. IdentityMesh Vault ships as a module of the sync engine you already own. Nominate an account, check it out, roll it back in — same UI, same roles, same install.

Migration

One .NET replacement covers sync and vaulting.

You already picked IdentityMesh to retire Microsoft Identity Manager. Adding CyberArk or Delinea on top puts you back into the two-product operations you were trying to escape. Vault ships in the same MSI and audits into the same hash chain.

Security & risk

Tamper-evident audit as a default, not an add-on.

Vault events extend the append-only audit hash chain, so no earlier event can be altered without detection. One active checkout is enforced by policy and by the database itself. A missing source account locks the record instead of silently de-vaulting on transient import failure.

Seven decisions we didn't make lightly.

Reuse the secret store you already run

Vault uses the same secret store as the rest of the product: DPAPI, Azure Key Vault, or HashiCorp Vault, depending on your deployment. There is no second key configuration to manage.

Rotate through a setter per target, or refuse

Rotation is delegated to a password setter for the connector type: Active Directory over LDAPS, a SQL Server login over its own connection (ALTER LOGIN), an Entra ID user over Graph (User-PasswordProfile.ReadWrite.All). SQL and Entra setters are new in this release. A connector type with no setter is refused at nomination rather than half-supported. The new password is written to the secret store under a pending reference before it touches the target, so a crash mid-rotation never loses a live credential.

OwnerProvidedBlindRotation

One active checkout per account

Policy and a database constraint enforce a single active session per account, and concurrency checks protect against duplicate requests and client retries. A credential is revealed strictly once: a second view is refused. New in this release, the requester can instead mint a one-time credential link and hand it to whatever actually needs the password. The recipient redeems it once, with no portal account, and the token travels in the request body so no log ever captures it. Also new, Connect: for accounts an administrator has listed target hosts for, the account is handed to IdentityMesh Connect, a launcher on the operator's PC. It redeems the check-out, signs Remote Desktop in as the account, and removes the credential when the session ends or the check-out expires. The operator picks the host and never sees the password.

Access by relationship, not by list

A Vault scope binds accounts to mesh groups. Who may request an account is derived from group membership the mesh already holds, imported from AD or built by Composer rules, instead of a hand-maintained safe. New in this release, accounts in no scope are refused to everyone until an administrator adds them to one (Vault:UnscopedAccountsOpen=true restores the old open behaviour during a rollout), and vault.admin does not bypass the rule on checkout. A Composer rule that exists only to gate the vault shows a Vault only badge; one that also provisions the group shows Provisioning.

Missing source locks — it does not delete

A missing source account blocks new checkouts and preserves its audit history. A transient import or replication failure cannot cause a vaulted account to silently disappear. New in this release, a source-missing sweep moves the account to SourceMissing, returns it to Active if the directory object reappears, and archives it only after the policy’s grace period. A pass that would archive more than a configurable cap archives nothing and logs an error, because that many at once usually means a narrowed import scope, not a wave of leavers.

Existing audit semantics stay consistent

Vault seeds vault.audit.read for the existing Viewer role rather than adding a new Auditor role. Admin and Operator receive broader Vault permissions.

Audit joins the platform hash chain

Vault audit events sit alongside admin and object audit events in the same append-only hash chain, so one verification run covers all of them and no earlier event can be altered without detection.

What Vault does — and what it doesn't.

Marketing pages that claim everything are worth nothing. Here is the current scope, honestly.

In scope, shipping today

  • Privileged-account nomination, approval, checkout, and check-in, with a one-time credential reveal
  • One-time credential link the recipient redeems without a portal account (new in this release)
  • Connect: the checked-out account is handed to the IdentityMesh Connect launcher on the operator's PC, which opens Remote Desktop as the account without ever showing the password (new in this release; see the Connect runbook)
  • Owner-provided or blind rotation for Active Directory, SQL Server logins, and Entra ID users
  • Rotation on check-in, on expiry, on demand, and on a per-policy schedule with failure backoff (scheduled rotation is new in this release)
  • Source-missing sweep that locks, restores, or archives an account whose directory object is gone (new in this release)
  • Vault scopes that grant access by mesh group membership; unscoped accounts are restricted by default
  • Tamper-evident audit joined to the platform audit hash chain
  • Scoped Viewer / Operator / Admin permissions, plus a vault-only User role

Refused rather than half-supported

  • Refused at nominationAccounts on connector types with no password setter, today Okta, Workday, and File, cannot be nominated. Marking an account fresh while its exposed password stays live would be worse than saying no.

Out of scope for v1

  • Privileged session recording (PSM equivalent)
  • Endpoint privilege management
  • Cloud infrastructure entitlements management

If session recording is a hard requirement, pair Vault with a session-recording tool of choice or stay with your current PAM for that workload. We would rather be clear than complete.

Setting keys, sweep behaviour, rotation prerequisites and a rollout checklist for the features marked new in this release are in the Vault operations runbook.

Compare your PAM renewal line by line.

Send us your CyberArk or Delinea quote. We'll map each line item to what's already included in IdentityMesh Vault — and be honest about what isn't.

Pricing benchmarks: Vendr and Vendor Benchmark 2026 (CyberArk, Delinea). Deployment complexity: Comparisec and StrongDM comparisons. Gartner Peer Insights review counts as of 2026.